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ABSTRACT
This case presents a set of technical issues confronting the United States Treasury eCheck Pilot Project team in January
2000. The team, which included representatives from the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Fleet Boston,
Bank of America, and several hardware and software vendors, was testing a new Internet-based payment mechanism
(eCheck). The system had already been tested for a year and a half with the participation of the two commercial banks (Fleet
Boston, Bank of America), but this portion of the pilot was now coming to an end. During the first phase of the project,
several key design choices had been made, including the use of smart cards to hold digital certificates, and specification of
the information flows among the participants (payer, payee, payer bank, payee bank). Now, the system would need to be
modified so that the U.S. Treasury could continue to make eCheck payments to a few defense contractors, with the help of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Two new designs are presented for evaluation.
Keywords: eCheck, Internet, payment mechanisms, systems design, emerging technologies

1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2000, the United States Treasury eCheck Pilot
Project team was planning the next phase of this test of a
new electronic payment mechanism, which involved
participation from the Treasury’s Financial Management
Service, the U.S. Department of Defense Finance and
Accounting Services Division, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, and a few Defense suppliers. An earlier phase
of the project had also involved two commercial banks,
Fleet Boston and Bank of America, but this next phase
would not include commercial banks. Thus it was
necessary to redesign the payment flows. One solution

had been suggested by Frank Jaffe, the outgoing manager of
the eCheck Pilot Test. Another solution was suggested by
Mike Versace, from the Federal Reserve Bank.
Participants on the eCheck team–especially the representative from the U.S. Treasury Financial Management Service
and Mike Versace from the Fed–needed to decide which of
these two approaches to take.
2. eCHECK PROJECT BACKGROUND
eCheck was one of several projects initiated by the Financial
Services Technology Consortium (FSTC), which consisted
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of financial institutions, hardware and software firms,
governmental agencies and others. The eCheck project,
begun in spring 1994, was aimed at developing a new
electronic payment mechanism for use in Internet
commerce and other contexts. A Proof-of-Concept
demonstration was held in 1995, and in 1996 a decision
was made to conduct a pilot test at the United States
Treasury (the decision was not announced until fall
1997, after all parties signed project contracts). Much
work was then done to flesh out the detailed
specifications for ensuring secure transactions before the
first eCheck was cut on June 30, 1998.
This case describes the evolution of the eCheck design
and technical specifications through winter 2000. A
companion case (Gogan, Gelinas and Rao, 2003)
addresses strategic and project management issues.
3. PROJECT PARTICIPANTS
The pilot project was officially announced on October 7,
1997. Participants (listed in Exhibit 1) had expected that
the pilot test would involve 50 vendors, run for one year,
and process up to 1,000 checks and $1 million per day.
But before payments could be made, several important
design issues had to be resolved. The next three sections
of the case discuss each of these design challenges.
4. SMART CARD DESIGN: A TOKEN CHOICE?
Early on, security experts on the eCheck design team
(such as Milt Anderson, a cryptography expert from
Bellcore, Ken Goldman, a security researcher at IBM,
Doug Kozlay, a founder of Information Resources
Engineering (IRE), and Chuck Wade, a specialist in PKI
services at BBN) urged the use of a separate “token” for
storing cryptographic private keys (a “security token” is
a simple hardware device, such as a smart card, key fob
or small keypad, that is used in conjunction with another
hardware device). A user would need to insert a specially designed card or device into a reader on their
computer, before an eCheck could be digitally signed
and sent on to the payee. Milt Anderson explained:
“In two-factor authentication, the user must have
something–a token–and know something–a
password. If I leave my laptop PC at the airport,
I’ll have plenty to worry about, but my eCheck
account will be safe. If my eCheck smart card
falls into the wrong hands, that’s okay as long as
the thief doesn’t know my password. If I carelessly reveal my password, then the thief must
obtain my smart card, which imposes one more
security hurdle for the bad guys to surmount.”
Some participants questioned the choice to store security
keys on smart cards. Frank Jaffe, who represented Bank
Boston and also served as overall eCheck project
manager, argued in favor of a simpler approach:

“Not all computers have PCMCIA slots, and I’m no
longer convinced a token is necessary, from a
business perspective. Another approach: store the
key for the user’s digital signature in an encrypted
file on their hard drive… This is not quite as secure
as a smart card, but … it’s good enough. Most firms
use firewalls to prevent unauthorized penetration.
There is always a trade-off between perfect security
and usability. Since it’s fairly unlikely that bad guys
can obtain digital signature keys on a large scale, it’s
more practical to establish just-in-case corrective
procedures for the unlikely event keys are
compromised.”
Security experts on the team argued that the use of a
hardware token is inherently more secure than a software
solution. After much discussion the team chose to err on the
side of caution and utilize a PCMCIA card. At the time
(1995) the team was told that virtually all PCs would be
equipped with PCMCIA slots by 1998. But as of 2000 few
desktop models had a PCMCIA slot (an external PCMCIA
device cost about $60), although most laptops did.
Meanwhile, by 1997 an alternative token was gaining ground:
the so-called “smart card,” which contains an embed-ded
processor. Initially it was felt that smart cards were not
powerful enough, but IRE and others on the team coded the
necessary function-ality into a new generation smart card
which was less expensive than a PCMCIA card (and, external
smart-card readers cost only about $20). Team members
agreed that a reasonable comp-romise between cost and
security was achieved.
5. HOW TO STUCTURE ECHECK DOCUMENTS?
A markup language defines how information will be
presented on an output device (such as a screen), and how
portions of a document can serve as input to appli-cation
programs. SGML (Standardized Generalized Markup
Language) is a set of specifications for creating a markup
language. HyperText Markup Language (HTML), used to
display web documents, is defined by SGML. In 1994 the
eCheck designers evaluated the use of a markup language to
structure eCheck documents. Some problems with extant
markup languages were identified, especially when a
necessary requirement was to digitally sign eChecks using
public key cryptography. So, the team developed a new
SGML-compatible mark-up language, for financial
applications only, and eCheck in particular: Financial
Services Markup Language (FSML). Milt Anderson noted:
“The simplicity of FSML makes it compatible with the
memory, process-sing, and interface speed limitations of
smart cards.” FSTC published the specifications for FSML in
fall 1998. That year, the World Wide Web Consortium
approved Extensible Markup Language (XML) Version 1.0.
XML meta-tags provide “information about infor-mation”
(i.e., tags indicate what type of information is in the
document), an approach that was similarly used in FSML.
The general-ized use of meta-tags in XML made it possible
to design a broad range of XML-compatible applications.
Had XML already been an established protocol just two
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you must convert the eCheck to ACH format and
you give up a lot. You no longer have any of the
attributes of a check when it gets posted to a
recipient’s ac-count. If we’re going to call it a check,
we should process it as a check.”

years earlier, the eCheck team would surely have given it
serious consideration (although FSML was a better fit for
the eCheck application, having been custom designed for
that purpose). By 2000, XML was a widely accepted
industry standard. The eCheck team planned to re-write
FSML as a subset of XML, but no deadline had been set.
It is worth noting also that XML presented a significant
technical hurdle for eCheck applications. Most markup
languages inherit from SGML a limitation that is not
found in other computer languages. Specifically, most
markup languages define internal names (e.g., variables)
as “global,” meaning that the same name must be unique
throughout a document. When two documents are
combined into a new document (not uncommon, and
vital for the eCheck application), name collisions must
be resolved by defining replacement names that will be
unique in the combined document. If documents have
been digitally signed, their names cannot be redefined,
since any change to a document invalidates the signature
(a useful feature if you don’t want someone modifying
the amount field in an eCheck after it has been signed).
This problem was resolved elegantly in FSML by
defining name scoping rules (similar to how most
computer languages work). An FSML name need be
unique only within a subdocument that contains the
name. Since XML lacks this feature, digitally signing
XML documents was a significant challenge that
required a few years of additional work. The FSTC
provided requirements that provided a foundation for an
IETF/W3C joint working group, known as XML DSig.
6. FOUR CORNER ECHECK MODEL OR
ECHECK LOCKBOX MODEL?
A key design choice was determining how communication would take place between payer and payee. The
eCheck team pioneered a method for using secure email
transmissions for eCheck itself and for related remittance information. Two processing models were
evaluated. A “four-corner” model (Exhibit 2) was
proposed in fall 1995; Treasury, the Fed, and Nations
Bank approved this approach. Subsequently Frank Jaffe
at Bank Boston advocated another approach. Instead of
fully paralleling paper check processing (see Exhibit 3),
Jaffe preferred to process eChecks in a manner similar to
a lockbox (Exhibit 4). He argued vigorously in favor of
the lockbox (Exhibit 5) approach, stating:
“The [traditional] four-corner model is far and
away the hardest one to implement, because all
four parties–payer, payee, payee’s bank and
payer’s bank–have to get equipped before you
can flow your first transaction through.”
The project manager at NationsBank, Steve Schutze, had
a different point of view:
“I see why you’re in favor of using a lock-box,
Frank, because it’s easier. But with a lock-box

Treasury and the Fed agreed with Steve Schutze that the
Pilot should test the peer-to-peer capabilities of eCheck (with
an eCheck being directly sent to the recipient, just like a
paper check). This choice meant that the NationsBank
eCheck server would need to be able to encapsulate eChecks
into a check image format (using X9.46, a standard that
governs the electronic exchange of digital images of checks).
Mike Versace preferred that eCheck utilize the Federal
Reserve Bank’s existing systems and network infra-structure
as much as possible (much of which was only recently
deployed). The Fed’s server would also apply digital
signatures and certifi-cates. In order to submit payments for
clearing through the existing Electronic Check Presentment
(ECP) system, the Fed’s server would “wrap” each eCheck
“image” in a secure enclosure (using another standard,
X9.37, which specifies how to enclose payment data for
clearing).
The U.S. Treasury wanted Treasury check law to apply to
the eCheck and this would not be the case with the lockbox
model. So, they too wanted eCheck to behave like a paper
check and be processed like a paper check. They wanted the
trial to test a “peer-to-peer” model of payment, which is
comparable to traditional paper check flows (i.e., an eCheck
is delivered directly to the payee, who logs its receipt and
then deposits it at their bank). 1
Once participants agreed to use the traditional “around the
outside” four-corner processing model, it was possible to
complete the necessary server software. On June 30, 1998,
Treasury cut the first eCheck, for $32,135.97 to pay GTE for
work on a Defense Department contract. The check was
cleared through the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and
deposited into GTE’s account at BankBoston.
7. MEDIATED Z-FLOW OR INTERNET PAYMENT
SERVICE MEDIATOR?
BankBoston and NationsBank committed to participate in a
12-month pilot (Fall 1997 – Fall 1998). In fall 1998
NationsBank merged with Bank of America, but Bank of
America agreed to an extension of the pilot (as did
BankBoston). In fall 1999 BankBoston was acquired by
Fleet Bank. Bank of America then announced that they
would withdraw from the pilot in spring 2000. Since the pilot
design required participation of two commercial banks, Fleet

1

If eCheck were used for other than Treasury checks, Uniform
Commercial Code sections 3 and 4 (check law) would apply only if
eChecks were processed in the same manner as paper checks, and
not converted to other payment systems (such as ACH, which is
governed by different laws and industry rules).
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Bank had to withdraw from the pilot. 2 By then, Fleet had
decided to spin off its eCheck interest into a new
venture, Clareon. Frank Jaffe decided to join Clareon, so
he would soon leave the eCheck team).
For the next phase of the Treasury Pilot, the team needed
to determine how to replace Bank of America and Fleet
as the vendors’ (payees’) banks. After some ideas were
discussed, Mike Versace at the Fed offered to have
vendors deposit their eChecks at the Fed, which would
then clear them through the Automated Clearing House
(see http://nacha.org/About/what_is_ach_.htm); He
explained (see Exhibit 6):
“Defense Department vendors will still receive
eChecks from Treasury. But with this new flow,
vendors will send their eChecks to the Fed. We
will then convert the eChecks to ACH credits to
transfer the funds from Treasury to the vendor.”
Versace added that the systems at the Fed would “figure
out where to send the money through the use of an
intelligent interface to the ACH network.” He was quite
enthusiastic about this approach:

special software at the bank. The service would
provide a raw ACH file to the bank.”
Jaffe’s design eliminated the need to install special server
software at participating banks, so he believed that bankers
would be enthusiastic about trying this new payment service.
Jaffe would also revisit the decision to use two-factor tokenbased authentication in this scenario. “I’d issue passwords to
users and design plenty of security into the central service,”
he explained. “I would not require users to insert a card into
a slot every time they want to make a payment.”
With the rapidly approaching withdrawal of Fleet and Bank
of America), in January 2000 it was time to decide on a new
processing flow. As they considered the merits of Frank
Jaffe’s Internet payment service versus the Fed’s Z-Flow
proposal, team members recalled that Milt Anderson (the
security expert from Bellcore) believed that an electronic
check could serve a greater variety of transaction types and
trading partners, more conven-iently and at a lower cost, than
any other payment mechanism. At the 1995 proof-of-concept
demonstration he had said (Gelinas and Gogan, 1997):
“eCheck is a message that tells existing demand
deposit accounting systems to do credits and debits
against existing systems. Encrypted digital signatures
will authenticate banks and customer accounts. The
code for producing and validating digital signatures
will reside on customers’ eCheckbooks (tokens), and
banks’ eCheck servers. Because an online
intermediary won’t be required to complete a
transaction, processing costs will be lower than
secure credit-cards or network money systems.”

“This clearinghouse model represents a different
way of thinking for the Fed. It puts us in a new
intermediary position–between vendors and their
banks. And, it gives us the opportunity to learn
more and extend our support for the Treasury.”
Before making a final decision, the team asked Frank
Jaffe for his opinion. Jaffe liked the idea. He replied:
“So, the Fed will become an originator of ACH
credits rather than clearing the payment as a
check. This approach is a better model for the
eCheck. The [traditional] four-corner model
should be dumped. It was done as a technology
proof-of-concept, but as a business model
implementation it’s the hardest way to go about
doing this and getting adoption, because too
many different parties need to be enabled.”

By January 2000 $3 million in payments had been issued in
the eCheck pilot; the largest single payment had been for
$230,000. The team considered: which of the two designs
best matches the intent of the original designers? More
importantly, which design represents the best solution as
eCheck moves out of the Treasury Pilot and on to
commercialization?

“Still,” he added, “one could go even further.” Jaffe laid
out yet another way to design the information flows (see
Exhibit 7), using a central Internet Payment Service:

The authors thank members of FSTC and the U.S. Treasury
eCheck Market Trial team, who generously gave time for
interviews, provided documentation, and reviewed case
drafts to verify facts. Our study received financial and inkind support from Bentley College, and was conducted under
the auspices of the Bentley College InVision Project (Jane
Fedorowicz, Principal Investigator), whose members
include: Ulric J. Gelinas, Janis L. Gogan, Phillip G. Knutel,
M. Lynne Markus, Amy W. Ray, Catherine A. Usoff and
Christine B. Williams.

“The right way to get adoption is to have a
processing service–be it a bank or not–to do justin-time application delivery. This would be a
service, not a technology or a software solu-tion.
There would be no customer-side install, and no

2
Another significant change was pending: FSTC signed a
memo of understanding to transfer the eCheck technology to
CommerceNet (another consortium) in January 2000. The
arrangement was never fully consummated, and FSTC later reestablished its stewardship of eCheck.
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Exhibit 1
eCheck United States Treasury Pilot Participants
Participant
BBN (GTE
Internetworking)
BankBoston (later
Fleet Boston) and
NationsBank (later
Bank of America)
Federal Reserve
Banks of Boston
and Richmond
IBM, with Agorics
Information
Resources
Engineering (IRE):
IntraNet
RDM Corporation
Sun Microsystems
U. S. Dep’t. of
Defense Finance
and Accounting
Services Division

Role
Provide certificate authority software and hardware, plus high-assurance cryptographic
hardware used by Treasury to sign eChecks. Chuck Wade initially managed BBN’s
part of the project.
Depository banks for the Department of Defense vendors. Heretofore, Frank Jaffe
managed the overall eCheck project, while also managing Bank Boston’s part of the
project. NationsBank’s part of the project was managed by Steve Schutze.
Clearing bank for U. S. Treasury. Mike Versace, who headed the Emerging Payment
System Group in the Fed’s Retail Payments Office, managed the Fed’s part of the
project, including end-to-end system testing (with participation by the Dallas Federal
Reserve).
Develop eCheck servers for BankBoston and NationsBank, to accept eChecks via
email and then process them through existing systems.
Develop smart-card technology and integrate with RDM software.
Develop software for converting eCheck data to X9.46 standard 3
Develop eCheck servers for Treasury and software for payees (Defense Department
suppliers) to receive eChecks and submit eCheck data to their own accounting systems.
Develop the eCheck servers for the Federal Reserve Bank
Actual provider of payments to Defense suppliers (by longstanding government policy,
Defense made its own payments, in contrast to most federal agencies, whose payments
are made by Treasury, although in this pilot, Treasury did act as the payments agent for
Defense).

3
In fall 1999 X9.46, was amended by ECCHO to include the eCheck image. X9.46 is a standard for electronic exchange of digital images
of checks. This format was used for submission of eChecks to the Fed in Phase I of the pilot. At the Fed this image was enclosed in an
X9.37 format for clearing. The X9B group of the Accredited Standards Committee, Inc. X9—Financial Services—agreed to add the
definition of eCheck to the X9.37 Electronic Check Exchange Standard.
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Exhibit 2
eCheck Processing: The Four-Corner Model
NOTE: Model used when the first eCheck was issued in June 1998

2a
Payer

eCheck (with payment advice)
[via Internet]
1

Payee

Payment
advice

2b

Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)

Indorsed
eCheck
[via Internet]
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)

Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
4b

3a

Payer's
bank

Payee's
Bank

Traditional check clearing
4a

3b

1. Payer (the U. S. Treasury) sends a digitally-signed eCheck (including certificates representing
the payer and their bank), along with payment advice data such as the supplier's (the payee's)
invoice number and amount paid.
2a. Payee's (DoD suppliers such as GTE) eCheck processing system strips off the payment advice
data and forwards it to its internal accounting system.
2b. Payee's eCheck processing system indorses the eCheck (by digitally signing the eCheck using
the payee's certificate issued to them by the bank), digitally signs the entire message and forwards
it to their bank (either BankBoston or NationsBank).
3a. Payee bank's eCheck processing system sends the deposit to the Demand Deposit Acount
(DDA) system where the payee's account is credited and from which the payee is notified on
their next statement.
3b. Payee bank's eCheck processing system encapsulates the eCheck into X9.46 formatted records
(Financial Image Exchange) and sends it to the Fed for clearing.
4a. The Fed encloses the eCheck into an X9.37 format (Electronic Cash letter/Electronic Check
Exchange) for clearing via Electronic Check Presentment (ECP) system. Being handled now like an
electronic representation of a paper check, the Fed credits the payee bank's account and debits the
payer bank's account. The eCheck is then forwarded to the payer's bank (in the pilot, also the Fed).
4b. Acting now as the Treasury's bank, the Fed debits the Treasury's account and sends a file of
payments to the Treasury where they reconcile the eChecks that they wrote with those that
cleared at the Fed.
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Exhibit 3
Paper Check Processing Model

Payer

Payee

Check (with payment advice)

Payment
advice

Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)

Endorsed
Check

Statement

Payer's
bank

Any Bank

Payment settled by FED

Exhibit 4
Lockbox Processing Model
3
Payer

Payment
advice

Payee
1

Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts

Check (with payment advice)
[mailed to payee PO box (the lockbox)]
Payment advice
[usually electronic]

Statement
4b

2a

Payer's
bank

Payee's
Bank

Traditional check clearing
4a

2b

1. Payer sends a paper check along with a paper payment (remittance) advice, such as a
payment stub from an invoice, to the payee's PO box (the lockbox processing center operated
by the payee's bank). The lockbox processing may be performed by a value-added network
(VAN).
2a. Payee bank enters the payment advice and check data into their computer system and
forwards the payment advice data to the payee. Copies of the payment advice documentation
might be sent to the payee via courier or scanned and faxed.
2b. Payee bank sends the check to the payer's bank for processing.
3. Payee sends the payment advice data to their internal accounting systems.
4a. The Fed processes the check by crediting the account for the payee's bank and debiting
the account for the payer's bank.
4b. The payer's bank debits the payer's account and notifies the payer, via their next
statement, that a deposit has been made
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Exhibit 5
eCheck Processing: The Lockbox Model
Note: Proposed, but not used in the pilot

3
US Treasury
(payer)

Payment
advice

Payee
1

Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)

echeck (with payment advice)
[via Internet]

Payment
advice

4b

Federal
Reserve Bank
(payer's bank)

2a

Payment settled by the Fed
4a

Payee's
Bank

2b

1. Payer (e.g., the U. S. Treasury) sends a digitally-signed eCheck (including certificates representing
the payer and their bank), along with payment advice data such as the supplier's (the payee's)
invoice number and amount paid to the electronic lockbox operated by the payee's bank.
2a. In the payee bank's (either BankBoston or NationsBank) electronic lockbox, the eCheck
processing system strips off the payment advice data and forwards it to the payee.
The deposit data is sent to the Demand Deposit (DDA) system where the payee's account is credited.
2b. Payee bank's eCheck processing system prepares and sends to the Fed either an ACH debit,
an eCheck for clearing through the traditional check clearing and settlement system, or a wire transfer.
3. Payee sends the payment advice data to their internal accounting systems.
4a. The Fed processes the ACH debit, eCheck, or wire transfer by crediting the account for the payee's
bank and debiting the account for the payer's bank. In this model the Fed is the payer's bank.
4b. Acting now as the Treasury's bank, the Fed debits the Treasury's account and sends a file
of payments to the Treasury where they reconcile the eChecks that they wrote with those that
cleared at the Fed.
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Exhibit 6
eCheck Processing: The Z-flow Model Proposed by the Fed
Note: Proposed by Fed for phase 2 of the pilot

1
US Treasury
(payer)

2a

eCheck (with payment advice)
[via Internet]

Payment
advice

Payee

2b
Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)
Endorsed
eCheck
[via Internet]

Confirmation
(e.g., statement)

Confirmation
(e.g., statement)

3b

4
3a
Federal
Reserve Bank
(payer's bank)

Credit push to Payee's Account
[via ACH (operated by Fed)]

Payee's
Bank

1. Payer (the U. S. Treasury) sends a digitally-signed eCheck (including certificates representing
the payer and their bank), along with payment advice data such as the supplier's (the payee's)
invoice number and amount paid.
2a. Payee's eCheck processing system strips off the payment advice data and forwards it to
the payee's internal accounting system.
2b. Payee's eCheck processing system endorses the eCheck (by digitally signing the eCheck
using the payee's certificate issued to them by their bank), digitally signs the entire message and
forwards it to the payer's bank (the Fed).
3a. The payer's bank (the Fed) originates an ACH credit that is sent to the payee's bank via the
ACH network.
3b. Acting as Treasury's bank, the Fed debits Treasury's account and sends a file of
payments to Treasury, which reconciles the eChecks that they wrote with those that
cleared at the Fed.
4. Payee's bank credits the payee's account and notifies the payee on their next statement.
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Exhibit 7
Mediated Flow Model Proposed by Frank Jaffe
NOTE: Internet Payment Service (IPS) Model proposed by Frank Jaffe for phase 2 of the pilot

1
Payer
Payment
[via web with SSL]

2

Payee

Notice of payment
[via e-mail]
Miscellaneous
communications
[via e-mail]

Miscellaneous
communications
[via e-mail]

IPS
5

Payment advice
[via web with SSL]

3

Confirmation
(e.g., statement)

Confirmation
(e.g., statement)

4b

4a
IPS' bank
4a

4b
ACH credit

ACH debit

Payee's
Bank

Payer's
Bank

1. Payer, using a Java applet that is delivered on demand by the IPS, makes a payment via the
IPS web site. The session is secured by SSL and the payments are signed with a digital signature.
The signing key is stored in an encrypted file on the payer's hard drive.
2. The IPS sends an e-mail to the payee notifying them of the payment.
3. The IPS notifies their bank of the payment.
4a. The IPS' bank generates an ACH debit. The Fed debits the payer bank's account at the Fed
and sends the debit on to the payer's bank. The payer's bank debits the payer's account and
notifies them via the regular bank statement.
4b. The IPS' bank generates an ACH credit. The Fed credits the payee bank's account at the
Fed and sends the credit on to the payee's bank. The payee's bank credits the payee's account
and notifies them via the regular bank statement.
5. The payee may obtain, via an SSL-secured web session, payment details that can be read
directly into their accounting applications.
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